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# Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key
High
[yuneng-berri](https://github.com/yuneng-berri)
published
GHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45
Sep 30, 2026
## Package
pip
litellm
([pip](https://github.com/advisories?query=ecosystem%3Apip))
## Affected versions
>= 1.91.0, < 1.100.4
>= 1.101.0, < 1.101.3
>= 1.102.0, < 1.102.2
>= 1.103.0, <1.103.1
>= 1.104.0rc1, < 1.104.0rc2
## Patched versions
1.100.4
1.101.3
1.102.2
1.103.1
1.104.0rc2
## Description
### Summary
An authenticated user with `internal_user` privileges can escalate to `proxy_admin` and achieve remote code execution. The proxy uses one encryption key for two purposes: sealing secrets at rest and minting session tokens. An attacker exploits this by requesting a new API key with a crafted metadata field containing a forged admin credential as the "secret" value. The proxy encrypts and returns this payload. When this value is then presented as a bearer token, the proxy decrypts it, trusts the forged admin identity, and grants full administrative access, including the ability to execute arbitrary commands via the MCP stdio endpoint.
### Affected versions
Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are exploitable only if `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=true` was explicitly set.
### Mitigation
Upgrade to a patched version as soon as possible.
If you cannot upgrade immediately, set `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false`. This disables the vulnerable authentication path but also breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login.
### Impact
An internal user can escalate to proxy admin and execute arbitrary commands on the host.
**Discovery Credit:** Hoa X. Nguyen (OPSWAT Unit 515)
### Severity
High
7.7
# CVSS overall score
This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10
#### CVSS v4 base metrics
##### Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
Present
Privileges Required
Low
User interaction
None
##### Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
##### Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
None
Learn more about base metrics
# CVSS v4 base metrics
##### Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector:
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity:
This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements:
This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required:
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction:
This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
##### Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality:
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity:
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability:
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
##### Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality:
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity:
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability:
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
### CVE ID
No known CVE
### Weaknesses
Weakness
CWE-269
#### [Improper Privilege Management](https://github.com/advisories?query=cwe%3A269)
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
[Learn more on MITRE.](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html)
Weakness
CWE-345
#### [Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity](https://github.com/advisories?query=cwe%3A345)
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
[Learn more on MITRE.](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html)
Weakness
CWE-441
#### [Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')](https://github.com/advisories?query=cwe%3A441)
The product receives a request, message, or directive from an upstream component, but the product does not sufficiently preserve the original source of the request before forwarding the request to an external actor that is outside of the product's control sphere. This causes the product to appear to be the source of the request, leading it to act as a proxy or other intermediary between the upstream component and the external actor.
[Learn more on MITRE.](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/441.html)
### Credits
- [@Haruna38](https://github.com/Haruna38)
[Haruna38](https://github.com/Haruna38)
Reporter