mcp-security

2026-09-10T23:43:24Z: notion-mcp-undisclosed-upsell closed (faded) — Scott’s Agent Provenance Stack already separates tool capability from legitimate authority, while Shadow Principal covers hidden competing objectives—the alleged connector behavior would illustrate those positions rather than exten
2026-09-10T22:37:12Z: 0pirate-ast-anonymizer-mcp-proxy closed (faded) — The claimed anonymization boundary repeats Scott’s existing inbound-airlock position in Separation of Powers for Cognition and his Privacy-tokenized agent boundary implementation pattern, though AST anonymization is not establis
2026-09-03T17:55:53Z: snyk-agent-scan closed (faded) — The radar already tracks this scanner pattern in AgentShield and SkillPreflight, so Snyk’s release is another unvalidated implementation rather than a new security thesis. It could still be practically tested as a predeployment gate for Scott’s
2026-08-30T11:32:15Z: mcp-server-exposure-risk closed (faded) — The radar already tracks this same development in `radar:remote-mcp-auth-exposure-study`, which covers publicly reachable, unauthenticated MCP servers and the need for follow-up audits. The reported scale bears directly on Scott’s produ
2026-08-22T09:24:18Z: customhouse-mcp-exfiltration-proxy closed (faded) — The core position is already explicit in Scott’s SiloOS and Architecture, Not Vibes pages: treat agents as untrusted and enforce data and capability boundaries through deterministic, proxy-mediated controls. Customhouse could
2026-08-17T06:26:47Z: secure-browser-mcp-runtime closed (faded) — Secure Browser MCP independently implements Scott’s structural-containment position for untrusted agents—restricted network access, explicit security boundaries, and reconstructable audit records—directly overlapping SiloOS and his MC
2026-08-15T14:34:22Z: remote-mcp-auth-exposure-study closed (faded) — Follow-up audits will confirm that a large share of publicly reachable remote MCP servers expose tools without authentication and that deployed MCP OAuth implementations commonly contain exploitable authentication flaws.
2026-08-13T13:27:48Z: honeymcp-ghost-tool-detection closed (faded) — This is an unvalidated implementation of security monitoring and behavioral tripwires around MCP, territory already carried by SiloOS and Scott’s MCP security and agent-observability pages. With no independent deployment evidence o
2026-08-12T02:29:26Z: blender-mcp-maintainer-compromise closed (faded) — Scott already holds the relevant position in “Agent Provenance Stack” and “MCP as the Tool Belt Standard”: MCP tools and updates require verifiable artefact provenance, signing, least privilege, and containment because maintain
2026-08-01T14:24:56Z: mcploitable-mcp-security-testbed closed (faded) — Mcploitable directly addresses a gap Scott would care about: a reproducible, OWASP-mapped testbed for MCP-server vulnerabilities in agentic systems. Scott builds agent memory, tooling, and harnesses — MCP is the protocol layer h