software-supply-chain
band: warmmomentum: stable
score: 0.318
Episodes (17)
Trajectory notes
- 2026-09-26T13:30:28Z: acs-local-skill-risk-catalog closed (absorbed) — The claimed file-and-line risk review repeats Scott’s source-anchored security-triage practice in WordPress Security Review & Plugin Signal Room; the radar already tracks pre-installation skill assessment in SkillPreflight, thoug
- 2026-09-11T05:23:18Z: operational-aibom-github-action closed (faded) — AI-component inventory is another example of the managed-component discipline Scott already holds in “12-Factor Agents Framework,” rather than a demonstrated extension or challenge to it. The radar hits do not establish prior tra
- 2026-09-11T04:26:44Z: git-yard-backdoor-detection closed (faded) — Lily’s reported commit/release backdoor checks independently converge with Scott’s pre-release verification approach and offer a concrete candidate to investigate for Superlever’s publication pipeline and the WordPress Security Revie
- 2026-09-07T02:32:56Z: gitspawn-repository-agent-hijack closed (faded) — The radar already tracks this development class in `radar:repository-content-agent-injection`: untrusted repository content steering coding agents despite sandboxing. It bears directly on Scott’s SiloOS containment architecture
- 2026-09-01T22:26:18Z: metr-agent-installed-code-incident closed (window-closed) — METR’s investigation independently approaches Scott’s load-bearing SiloOS and Agent Provenance Stack position: coding agents must be treated as untrusted, structurally contained workers, while installed artefacts and e
- 2026-08-27T09:36:33Z: proofcore-oidc-release-notarization closed (faded) — Scott already holds the governing position in “Agent Provenance Stack” and “Mechanically Different Verifiers”: release provenance must bind identity, artefact and execution, while security claims require genuinely independent
- 2026-08-25T15:47:16Z: arrayref-crates-supply-chain-compromise closed (faded) — This is a Rust-specific instance of dependency risk already covered by Scott’s Sovereign Software Assurance requirement that dependencies be explicit, auditable, and governable. It adds no established exposure finding or
- 2026-08-13T14:40:20Z: openjdk-ai-generated-code-ban closed (faded) — OpenJDK’s categorical exclusion of generated output challenges Scott’s position that authorship and trustworthy AI-assisted code can be established through owned intent, provenance, testing, and acceptance rather than personal typi
- 2026-08-13T13:28:12Z: github-actions-oidc-audience-gap closed (faded) — The claimed cross-service reuse risk directly converges with Scott’s audience-bound capability-token and provenance position, and successful reproduction would provide a dated-receipts opportunity while bearing on credential con
- 2026-08-12T02:29:26Z: blender-mcp-maintainer-compromise closed (faded) — Scott already holds the relevant position in “Agent Provenance Stack” and “MCP as the Tool Belt Standard”: MCP tools and updates require verifiable artefact provenance, signing, least privilege, and containment because maintain